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ABSTRACT
Testimony about the future dangerousness of a person has become a central staple 
of many judicial processes. In settings such as bail, sentencing, and parole deci-
sions, in rulings about the civil confinement of the mentally ill, and in custody deci-
sions in a context of domestic violence, the assessment of a person’s propensity 
towards physical or sexual violence is regarded as a deciding factor. These assess-
ments can be based on two forms of expert testimony: actuarial or clinical. The 
purpose of this paper is to examine the scientific and epistemological basis of both 
methods of prediction or risk assessment. My analysis will reveal that this kind of 
expert testimony is scientifically baseless. The problems I will discuss will generate 
a dilemma for factfinders: on the one hand, given the weak predictive abilities of 
the branches of science involved, they should not admit expert clinical or actuarial 
testimony as evidence; on the other hand, there is a very strong tradition and a vast 
jurisprudence that supports the continued use of this kind of expert testimony. It is 
a clear case of the not so uncommon conflict between science and legal tradition. 
Keywords: Behavior Prediction, Clinical Testimony, Actuarial Testimony, Risk Assess-
ment, Mental Illness.
A predição do comportamento 
futuro: as promessas vazias das 
perícias atuarial e clínica
 
THE PREDICTION OF FUTURE 
BEHAVIOR: THE EMPTY PROMISES 
OF EXPERT CLINICAL AND 
ACTUARIAL TESTIMONY1
1  Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the III Encuentro Latinoamericano de 
Epistemología Jurídica in México City, at PHILOGICA IV in Bogotá, at the School of Law of the 
Universidad Alberto Hurtado in Santiago de Chile, and at the School of Law of the Universidad 
Austral de Chile in Valdivia. I would like to thank the audience of these talks for useful 
comments and suggestions.
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O testemunho sobre a periculosidade futura de uma pessoa tem sido uma marca 
central de muitos processos judiciais. Em contextos tais como pagamento de 
fiança, proferimento de sentença e decisões sobre liberdade condicional, con-
finamento civil do doente mental e costódia em casos de violência doméstica, a 
avaliação da propensão de uma pessoa à violência física ou sexual é considerada 
um fator fundamental. Essas avaliações podem ser baseadas em duas formas de 
perícia: atuarial ou clínica. O propósito deste artigo é examinar a base científica 
e epistemológica de ambos os métodos de predição ou de avaliação de risco. 
Minha análise revelará que este tipo de perícia não possui fundamento. Os prob-
lemas que serão discutidos gerarão um dilema para os investigadores dos fa-
tos no processo judicial: por um lado, dadas as habilidades preditivas fracas dos 
ramos da ciência envolvidos, não deveriam admitir a perícia atuarial e clínica 
como meios de prova; por outro lado, há uma tradição muito forte e uma vasta 
jurisprudência que dá suporte ao uso contínuo deste tipo de prova pericial. Este 
é um caso claro do não tão incomum conflito entre a ciência e a tradição jurídica.
Keywords: Predição do comportamento, Perícia clínica, Perícia atuarial, Avaliação de 
risco, Doença mental.
Resumo
1. INTRODUCTION
In October 2012, six Italian seismologists and a government official 
were found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to six years 
each for failing to adequately warn residents of the risk before the 
earthquake that hit the city of L’Aquila in 2009 killing 308 people. 
The verdict sent shockwaves throughout the scientific community. 
Nature published an editorial calling the verdict “perverse and 
the sentence ludicrous”2. In 2014, an appeals court acquitted 
the seismologists and reduced to two years the sentence of the 
government official.
Unreasonable expectations about the predictive abilities of a branch 
of science are not uncommon in law. They are at the basis not only of 
unwarranted negligence claims, but also of legal decisions that have 
a scientific veneer but that make use of predictions that the scientific 
community at large does not sanction. Consider the Adam Walsh 
Child Protection and Safety Act (2006), an American federal statute 
that establishes among its provisions a controversial post-conviction 
2  Editorial, 2012, p. 446.
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civil commitment scheme. The Commitment Provision3 allows the 
federal Bureau of Prisons to keep inmates in prison past their release 
date if the government can prove “by clear and convincing evidence”4 
that the inmate is a “sexually dangerous person”, i.e. one “who has 
engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child 
molestation and who is sexually dangerous to others”5. A person is 
sexually dangerous to others insofar as he “suffers from a serious 
mental illness, abnormality, or disorder as a result of which he would 
have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or 
child molestation if released”6. The American Psychiatric Association 
has repeatedly objected to the civil commitment of sex offenders on 
scientific grounds. In 1999, a task force created by the APA declared: 
[S]exual predator commitment laws represent a serious assault on the 
integrity of psychiatry, particularly with regard to defining mental ill-
ness and the clinical conditions for compulsory treatment. Moreover, 
by bending civil commitment to serve essentially non-medical purpo-
ses, sexual predator commitment statutes threaten to undermine the 
legitimacy of the medical model of commitment. (…) [P]sychiatry must 
vigorously oppose these statutes, to preserve the moral authority of the 
profession and to ensure continuing societal confidence in the medical 
model of civil commitment7.
Most of the debate has focused on the clinical methods used to 
assess the risk that the offender is likely to commit future acts of 
sexual violence, and on the type of information that can be used in 
that assessment. During the process, the Department of Justice can 
consider past conduct that did not result in an arrest, prosecution or 
conviction. In fact, offenders can be certified for civil commitment 
even if they have no prior criminal record of sex offenses: “It is not 
3  The Commitment Provision has its roots in two previous Supreme Court decisions: Kansas v. 
Hendriks (1997) and Kansas v. Crane (2002).
4  18 U.S.C. §4248(d). The standard is lower than the one required for the original criminal 
conviction, viz. “beyond all reasonable doubt”. 
5  18 U.S.C. §4247(a)(5).
6  18 U.S.C. §4247(a)(6). 
7  American Psychiatric Association Task Force on Sexually Dangerous Offenders, 1999, p. 
173. The Commitment Provision has also been challenged on constitutional grounds. In 2009, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Richmond, Va., ruled that none 
of the powers granted to Congress in the Constitution empowered it to authorize such civil 
commitments. In 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the Adam Walsh Act in United States v. 
Comstock. Justice Breyer made it clear that the court was not ruling on the separate question of 
whether the Commitment Provision violated the Constitution’s due process clause. See Baker 
(2009) for a discussion of the constitutional issues involved.
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necessary that a person have been charged with or convicted of any 
criminal act related to the conduct being considered — a limitation 
that could prevent a mental health professional from considering 
probative and relevant evidence such as long-established patterns 
of behaviour, admissions of criminal activity previously undetected 
by authorities, and statements of intent to commit future sexually 
violent crimes or acts of child molestation”8.
The use of scientific predictions in law is limited to the two types 
of cases illustrated by the previous two examples. The first type is 
constituted by negligence claims. Negligence covers a wide territory, 
including claims related to a doctor’s liability for a patient’s lost 
chance to recover from illness, claims about the unforeseen negative 
impact of a product or a construction project on the environment 
or on people’s health, or about the unanticipated dire financial 
effects of a stock market transaction on stockholders’ investments. 
Negligence claims are very fact-specific and the examples could be 
multiplied ad nauseam. If one is interested in the limits of scientific 
prediction, one must distinguish between liability caused by scientific 
errors and mistakes due to carelessness, inattention, or purposeful 
deception, from liability caused by scientific predictions that could 
have reasonably been made at the time but were not9. It is the latter 
type of liability that will be relevant10.
The second type of case involves the prediction of people’s future 
behavior, especially of a violent or sexual nature, in settings such as 
capital sentencing, bail and parole decisions, rulings about the civil 
confinement of the mentally ill, and custody decisions in a context 
of domestic violence.11 These predictions can be based on two forms 
of expert testimony: actuarial or clinical. By far, the most common is 
clinical prediction, either by a psychiatrist or a psychologist, although 
actuarial testimony is often used in parole board hearings.
8  Bureau of Prisons, 2007, p. 43207.
9  The difference between a scientifically predictable and a reasonably foreseeable event, as 
defined in the law of torts, is a question of degree. Almost all the cases I have in mind require 
expert testimony given the mathematical (probabilistic) nature of the facts involved.
10  For a clarification of the basic concepts involved, see WRIGHT, 1988.
11  The two types of cases came together in the 1970s, when courts imposed tort liability on 
clinicians who negligently failed to predict their patients’ future violent behavior. The therapist’s 
duty to protect potential victims stems from the Supreme Court of California’s decision in 
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California 1976.
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The purpose of this paper is to examine this second type of 
prediction in legal contexts. The legal scenarios in which future 
behavior is relevant vary widely, from capital sentencing to child 
custody, and the decisionmakers range from juries and judges, to 
parole boards. It is therefore difficult to take into account all the 
specific details and circumstances involved in the use of predictions 
of future behavior in particular cases. Instead, my strategy will 
be to focus on the slim scientific and epistemological basis of 
the prediction of future behavior in general. The problems I will 
discuss will generate a dilemma for judges: on the one hand, given 
the weak predictive abilities of the branches of science involved, 
they should not admit expert clinical or actuarial testimony as 
evidence12; on the other hand, there is a very strong tradition 
and a vast jurisprudence that supports the continued use of this 
kind of expert testimony. The resolution of this dilemma lies in an 
epistemically responsible revision of the admissibility rules for this 
kind of evidence. 
In the final section I will examine some consequences of adopting 
either method of behavior prediction. I will focus on the strong 
epistemic dependence on expert testimony in this type of decisions, 
a dependence that exceeds almost any other legal scenario 
because it is very difficult to find ancillary evidence to support 
a prediction about future behavior that does not involve more 
expert testimony. I will argue that in some cases this dependency 
on expert testimony jeopardizes the independence between 
the scientific and the legal standard of proof, between the level 
of confidence required to make the prediction and the standard 
of proof used to decide the case. I will also argue that reliance 
on actuarial methods in particular makes it more likely that the 
resulting judicial policies that emerge will be more an artifact of 
the instrument used than of sound political and moral decisions. 
Although my analysis will be circumscribed to American law, the 
lessons for other legal systems are fairly obvious.
12  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 1993.
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2. CLINICAL TESTIMONY
In this section I will examine the scientific and epistemological 
foundations of clinical testimony, the first of the two types 
of expert testimony regularly used to determine the future 
behavior of a defendant or an offender13. Clinical testimony is 
widely regarded as the more problematic of the two generators 
of future behavior predictions14.
There is little controversy regarding the kind of future criminal 
behaviour that the legal system ought to prevent. But it is far from 
clear what findings of fact will enable it to predict the behaviour it 
seeks to prevent. Let us return initially to the Commitment Provision 
of the Adam Walsh Act (AWA)15 and examine the methodology 
used to assess the risk that the inmate is likely to commit future 
acts of sexual violence if released. According to the AWA, a 
finding of likelihood of sexual recidivism based on the diagnosis 
of a volitional impairment is a necessary requirement for civil 
commitment. The problem is that there is no conceptual clarity on 
what exactly is being diagnosed. “The field of risk assessment [of 
the likelihood of sexual recidivism] is lacking consistent empirical 
support defining volitional impairments relevant to a threshold for 
legal civil commitment”16. The statute does not define the terms 
“serious mental illness”, “abnormality”, or “disorder”, mentioned 
in the definition of a sexually dangerous person, expecting perhaps 
that expert clinical testimony, the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders) or the ICD (International Statistical 
13  Clinical testimony can be either completely unstructured, based solely on the clinician’s 
experience, or aided by actuarial instruments. Most of the discussion in this section refers to 
unstructured clinical assessments, which are the most common basis for expert testimony in 
court. Since the next section criticizes the epistemological basis of current actuarial instruments 
in general, I consider it unnecessary to devote a separate section to “mixed” methods that 
include both clinical and actuarial criteria.
14  For a defense of the view that individualized clinical assessments of the likely dangerousness 
of people are superior to actuarial ones, see LITWACK, 2001; for the opposing view targeted 
by LITWACK, see QUINSEY et al., 1999. HARCOURT, 2007, also opposes actuarial methods, 
but instead of individualized assessments of future dangerousness, he proposes a turn to 
randomness in punishment and policing.
15  Under Canadian law a court can impose a similar sentence called “indeterminate 
detention”. It is imposed, among other reasons, when “the offender, by his or her conduct in 
any sexual matter including that involved in the commission of the offence for which he or she 
has been convicted, has shown a failure to control his or her sexual impulses and a likelihood of 
causing injury, pain or other evil to other persons through failure in the future to control his or 
her sexual impulses” (Criminal Code, XXIV, 753 (1)(b)).
16  FABIAN, 2012, p. 309.
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Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems)17 will be 
able to fill in the blanks.
Fitch reports that 85% of offenders committed under sexually violent 
predatory laws in the United States have been diagnosed with 
paraphilias, which are abnormal sexual behaviors listed both in the 
DSM and the ICD18. But a paraphilia is a highly controversial concept 
that depends on what is considered sexually deviant at a particular 
place and time. Up until 1973, for example, homosexuality was 
classified as a paraphilia under the DSM-II. Any proposed definition 
of “paraphilia’’ is thus “vulnerable to societal pressures rather than 
advances in science”19. More recent versions of the manuals have 
not provided further clarity about the concept. There are significant 
differences between the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013) and the ICD-10 (World Health Organization, 2010) regarding 
which disorders are included and how they are categorized20. It is 
not surprising, therefore that there is a growing chorus calling for 
the removal of paraphilias from the DSM21.
Philosophers of science have also questioned the theoretical basis 
of these classifications. Murray, for example, argues that the current 
literature on mental illness lacks a coherent concept of the mental 
and a satisfactory account of disorder22. In his view, the DSM classifies 
mental illnesses according to their discernible symptoms, ignoring 
the underlying causal structure of the mind. This classification is 
useful for treatment purposes, but without an understanding of the 
mental mechanisms involved it seems woefully unsuitable for the 
purpose of predicting future behavior23.
Aside from the controversial and highly debated definitional issues 
regarding paraphilias and mental illnesses, there are many other 
straightforward and noncontroversial methodological problems 
with the prediction of future behaviour based on clinical diagnosis. 
In what follows I will briefly present some of the main issues. 
17  All WHO member countries are required to follow the definitions in the ICD, but the DSM 
carries more weight among psychiatrists and psychologists.
18  FITCH, 2003.
19  ZONANA, 2011, p. 249.
20  REED, 2010.
21  MOSER and KLEINPLATZ, 2005.
22  MURRAY, 2006.
23  I am grateful to Santiago Amaya for calling my attention to this issue.
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The first problem with clinical expert testimony is that experts often 
overestimate base rates24, which in turn leads to over-conservative 
decisions regarding the release of prisoners. Prediction of an event 
becomes more difficult the further downwards the base rate 
departs from 0.5. The base rate for recidivism of violent crimes, 
according to many studies, is never higher than 20%25, and for 
sexual crimes it is between 10% and 15% after 5 years, and 20% 
after 10 years26. Additionally, people with medical training, such as 
psychiatrists, tend to overestimate the base rate to a higher degree 
than psychologists27. Decisionmakers also often overestimate how 
much information they possess. This leads them to overconfidence 
and to decisions that are not warranted by the data28. They also 
rely on highly salient information that has relatively little predictive 
value, such as history of institutional violence29.
Often mental health practitioners testifying in court shore up 
their judgments by mentioning their accumulated experience. In 
statements such as: “In my 20 years of experience judging similar 
cases…” the listener is supposed to find a good reason to believe 
the expert witness’ testimony. Although accumulated experience is 
a necessary condition for expertise and a good reason to believe a 
person’s judgment in many contexts, research shows that in the case 
of clinical prediction accumulated experience is basically irrelevant. 
Several authors have shown that there is little empirical evidence 
supporting expert status for clinicians on the basis of their training, 
experience, or information processing ability30. Often experts 
with the same degree of experience disagree in their diagnosis of 
psychiatric patients31, and despite the lack of correlation between 
experience and predictive accuracy, the confidence of clinicians in 
their diagnosis increases with experience32. Several studies have 
24  Base rates refer to the relative frequency of a state or condition in a population or a series 
of events. The overestimation of base rates might be the result of the fact that clinical experts 
rely on their professional practice, in which the frequency of mental illnesses is much higher 
than in the general population.
25  YANG et al., 2010.
26  HANSON, 2003.
27  QUINSEY, 1981.
28  WIGGINS, 1973.
29  QUINSEY, 1979.
30  WIGGINS, 1973; SCHINKA & SINES, 1974.
31  QUINCEY and AMBTMAN, 1979.
32  GOLDBERG, 1968.
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compared the predictive abilities of experienced clinicians with that 
of graduate students and lay people. In a famous study, Quincey and 
Ambtman compared the predictions of nine teachers and four senior 
forensic psychiatrists regarding the behavior of 30 people who had 
been released from prison. Based on the same data set, the teachers 
were more accurate in their predictions than the experts33.
In view of all of these methodological problems, in an amicus curiae 
addressed to the Supreme Court of the United States in Barefoot 
(1983), the APA rejected the use of clinical predictions of long-term 
future behaviour:
Psychiatrists should not be permitted to offer a prediction concerning 
the long-term future dangerousness of a defendant in a capital case, 
at least in those circumstances where the psychiatrist purports to be 
testifying as a medical expert possessing predictive expertise in this 
area. Although psychiatric assessments may permit short-term predic-
tions of violent or assaultive behavior, medical knowledge has simply 
not advanced to the point where long-term predictions —the type of 
testimony at issue in this case— may be made with even reasonable 
accuracy. The large body of research in this area indicates that, even 
under the best of conditions, psychiatric predictions of long-term future 
dangerousness are wrong in at least two out of every three cases34.
Most of the problems that led the APA to this conclusion were well 
known in the medical and psychological literature at the time, but 
they seem to have had very little effect on changing the culture 
of admitting clinical predictions as an acceptable form of expert 
testimony. Quite the contrary: In Barefoot, the Supreme Court 
stated that since the APA did not claim “that psychiatrists are 
always wrong with respect to future dangerousness, only most 
of the time”35, it would not exclude such testimony: “we are no 
more convinced now that the view of the APA should be converted 
into a constitutional rule barring an entire category of expert 
testimony. (…) The suggestion that no psychiatrist’s testimony may 
be presented with respect to a defendant’s future dangerousness 
is somewhat like asking us to disinvent the wheel”36. The Court´s 
33  QUINCEY and AMBTMAN, 1979.
34  Brief for Amicus Curiae of the American Psychiatric Association, 1983, p. 3.
35  Barefoot, p. 901.
36  Barefoot, p. 899 and 896.
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decision made clinical predictions of future dangerousness37 
unavoidable in many court proceedings, and the issue is not likely 
to be challenged any time soon38.
3. ACTUARIAL TESTIMONY
In its amicus curiae in Barefoot, the American Psychiatric Association 
also asserted that the most reliable predictors of long-term future 
dangerousness were factors that have nothing to do with psychiatric 
disorders or illnesses, such as age, sex, and previous convictions, 
among others. In consequence:
[T]he long-term prediction of future dangerousness is an essentially lay 
determination that should be based not on the diagnoses and opinions 
of medical experts, but on the basis of predictive statistical or actuarial 
information that is fundamentally non-medical in nature. The psychia-
tric gloss on such data furnished by expert medical testimony provides 
little, if any, additional information to the jury39.
The use of psychiatric expert testimony to present actuarial data can 
cause great damage to the defendant. By dressing up the actuarial 
information in a medical disguise, a psychiatrist´s testimony will 
receive undeserved credibility. Expert clinical testimony is more 
persuasive to jurors than actuarial testimony, even after cross-
examination and after being confronted with testimony from 
a rival expert40. Psychiatric testimony also spares the jury the 
difficult task of interpreting statistical data, relying instead on the 
expert’s interpretation, which is provided using the same expertise 
possessed by a layman. For these reasons, the APA considers that 
psychiatric testimony should be eliminated from the fact-finding 
process if the goal is to predict long-term future dangerousness, 
and that it should be replaced with actuarial instruments. 
Nowadays, over 60% of general psychiatric patients are routinely 
37  It should be noted that the mysterious-sounding expression “the prediction of future 
dangerousness” has fallen into disuse in recent times, and most predictions are now stated in 
the vocabulary of “risk assessment”. This reflects, according to HAMILTON (2015, p. 7-8), the 
shift from clinical towards actuarial methods.
38  The Court reached similar decisions in Schall v. Martin (1984) and United States v. Salerno 
(1987).
39  Brief for Amicus Curiae of the American Psychiatric Association, 1983, p. 5.
40  KRAUSS & SALEs, 2001.
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assessed for violence risk using actuarial instruments41, rising to 
above 80% in forensic psychiatric hospitals42.
Policymakers in the judicial system have also embraced the 
use of actuarial methods. Their goal is to find cost-effective 
solutions to criminal offending. Actuarial methods allow officials 
to reserve prison resources for high-risk offenders and to identify 
good candidates for rehabilitation in cheaper community-based 
programs43. According to a 2004 survey, out of the 32 US states 
that granted parole at the time, 23 had used actuarial instruments 
as part of these decisions44.
There are over 150 actuarial instruments in use, and they are 
starting to be used in developing countries45. In this section I will 
examine some of the best-known actuarial instruments used in 
the prediction of future violent and sexual behavior, seeking to 
establish whether the faith placed in them by the judicial system 
and by the APA is guaranteed from an epistemological point of 
view. To anticipate, I will argue that the use of these methods to 
predict future dangerous is epistemically unacceptable and that 
their indiscriminate use in the judicial system can lead to serious 
and dire consequences.
Actuarial methods are based on statistical data about risk factors 
that are known to predict recidivism across contexts and individuals. 
These factors are combined and each factor is assigned a weighted 
score. The goal is to provide a final score for each individual, which 
is then associated to a specific risk level according to pre-established 
criteria. For example, an individual score between 15 and 20 on a 
questionnaire could mean that the individual will be classified as 
“high risk”. Some methods are applied across the board; others are 
designed for specific types of offenders or crimes. Here I will focus 
only on violent or sexual offenders. Risk factors can be static or 
dynamic. Static factors include age, educational level, occupation, 
sexual and nonsexual criminal history, and previous alcohol 
problems, among others. Dynamic factors are those that can vary 
41  HIGGINS et al., 2005.
42  KHIROYA et al., 2009.
43  HAMILTON, 2015.
44  HARCOURT, 2007.
45  FAZEL et al., 2012.
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in time, in particular during the reclusion period. They include a 
tendency towards interpersonal conflicts, substance abuse, and 
tolerance towards sexual violence.
The best known and most widely used actuarial instruments for 
violence and sexual risk assessment are the Violence Risk Appraisal 
Guide (VRAG) and the Static-9946. VRAG assesses the risk of further 
violent behavior among people who have already committed violent 
crimes. It includes 12 items including one that requires determining 
psychopathy using the Psychopathy Checklist (revised) (PCL-R)47. 
VRAG is perhaps the most researched instrument in terms of 
replications and cross-validation48. SORAG49 is a variation of VRAG 
for sexual offenders, in particular, for men convicted for offences 
of rape or child molestation. Static 99 was developed to assess the 
risk of recidivism among patients convicted for sexual crimes. It only 
considers static factors; hence the name50.
An initial problem with these methods stems from the very nature of 
probabilistic phenomena: If the base rate of an event is very low, no 
statistical predictive instrument will be very effective51. As we saw in 
the previous section, the base rates for violent and sexual recidivism 
in most populations is at most 20%. It is true that the base rates for 
the samples used to design VRAG and Static 99 were higher: 31% 
for the former after 7 years, and 21% for the latter after 10 years52. 
However, there is plenty of evidence that these results do not 
reflect the general recidivism base rates in the general population 
of violent and sexual offenders. When more realistic base rates are 
used, the predictive success of both instruments falls dramatically. 
For example, when a 10% base rate is used for patients classified 
46  HARRIS et al., 1993 and 2003.
47  See HARE, 1991. As LITWACK point out (2001, p. 413), this makes VRAG crucially dependent 
on clinical assessments since PCL-R measures a personality variable that requires clinical 
judgment to obtain. Litwack’s ultimate purpose is to show that actuarial methods have not 
been proven to be superior to clinical ones, but if, as I argue here, both methods are equally 
suspect, it becomes irrelevant whether one is slightly less inaccurate than the other.
48  SKEEM and MONAHAN, 2011.
49  QUINSEY et al., 1998.
50  Other well-known actuarial instruments include the SIR (Statistical Information on 
Recidivism) scale and SONAR (Sex Offender Need Assessment Record). The former only 
includes static factors. It is modestly successful in predicting general recidivism but it is not very 
effective in the prediction of violent or sexual crimes; the latter focuses on changes in dynamic 
factors during incarceration and serves as a complement for other actuarial instruments.
51  MOSSMAN, 2008.
52  HASTINGS et al., 2011.
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as “high risk” using VRAG, 69% would represent false predictions 
of recidivism53. The problem is not just that violence and sexual 
risk prediction is an inexact science54. The discussion below will 
show that it is seriously flawed and that it introduces undesirable 
distortions in the legal system.
The financial system and the insurance industry make effective use of 
actuarial predictive instruments. The effectiveness and confidence 
of the decisions they make for individual cases is based on their 
knowledge of all the relevant variables with a proven relationship 
with future risk, for example, the probability that people within a 
certain population will default on their mortgages. The situation 
is entirely different within the legal system. In particular, there is 
no reliable information about the true recidivism rates for several 
violent offenses. Recidivism rates for sexual or violent crimes 
are based on officially recorded information, such as an arrest, a 
criminal conviction, or incarceration55. This information is unreliable 
for two reasons. The first one is that it constitutes only a fraction of 
the true reoffense rates. It is well known that most sexual crimes, 
for example, are not reported. According to the National Crime 
Victimization Survey conducted by the US Justice Department, 68% 
of sexual assaults committed between 2008 and 2012 were left 
unreported. An earlier report by the US Bureau of Justice Statistics 
showed that the majority of rapes and sexual assaults perpetrated 
against females between 1992 and 2000 were not reported to the 
police. Only 36 percent of rapes, 34 percent of attempted rapes, 
and 26 percent of sexual assaults were reported56. The very nature 
of these crimes, which are often committed by family members, 
makes it unlikely that these statistics will improve.
The second reason is that there is a lack of clarity regarding what 
counts as a violent crime. For example, in some jurisdictions entering 
53  HAMILTON, 2015, p. 40.
54 General recidivism is easier to predict, i.e. predictions can be made with higher statistical 
confidence, because the base rate of minor or moderately serious offenses is much higher than
the base rate for violent or sexual crimes.
55  Different actuarial instruments use different methods to determine recidivism: convictions, 
arrests, probation/parole violations, or self-reports. This methodological difference makes them 
incommensurable.
56  RENNISON, 2002.
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an empty house to commit burglary counts as a violent crime57. 
Counting such crimes as violent offenses offers a distorted picture 
of the base rate for violent recidivism. Furthermore, Quinsey et al. 
claim that the VRAG score is “positively related to the probability of 
at least one violent reoffense”58. However, without a more detailed 
definition of what counts as a violent reoffense, the VRAG score can 
generate widespread injustice: “Even an almost 100% probability 
that an offender, if released, will commit a simple assault within the 
next 10 years would not justify that offender’s continued retention 
by any reasonable cost-benefit analysis”59. The uncertainty about 
recidivism rates does not allow an adequate analysis of the actuarial 
instrument, in particular, regarding the rate of false negatives and 
false positives. Without this information it is impossible to correctly 
assess the sensitivity and specificity of the actuarial instrument, and 
a fortiori, to calculate its error rate60.
Perhaps the most problematic feature of most actuarial methods is 
that their actual success rate is very modest. Consider initially the 
study that provided the basis for the development of VRAG61. The 
study was conducted among 618 juvenile and adult male offenders 
who had been released from secure confinement after being treated 
in the maximum-security Oak Ridge psychiatric facility in Ontario 
or briefly assessed there prior to imprisonment. After 7 years their 
recidivism rate was determined. When the offenders were divided 
into high and low risk according to the 12 predictor variables 
that constitute VRAG, using a cutoff score of 7, they obtained the 
following results: 
57  The US Supreme Court has regarded burglary as violent in some cases (James v. United 
States, 2007; Taylor v. United States, 1990), and as non-violent in others (Solem v. Helm, 1983; 
Tennessee v. Garner, 1985). It is counted as a violent crime under the Sentencing Guidelines 
of the United States (United States Sentencing Commission, 2013). The main argument for
counting it as violent is that the potential for violence is always present. The classification is 
liable to being manipulated for political purposes, in particular, by fear-mongering politicians.
58  QUINSEY et al., 1998, p. 149.
59  LITWACK, 2001, p. 429.
60  Sensitivity and specificity are statistical measures of the performance of a classificatory
instrument such as VRAG. The sensitivity of a risk assessment instrument is its ability to detect
true positives, people classified as high risk who will recidivate, while its specificity is its ability 
to detect true negatives, people classified as low risk who will not recidivate. Technically, 
sensitivity is defined as the number of true positives divided by the total number of people 
in the population who will recidivate, including the false negatives: TP/(TP + FN). Specificity 
is defined as the number of true negatives divided by the total number of people in the 
population who will not recidivate, including the false positives: TN/(TN + FP).
61  HARRIS et al., 1993.
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Table 1: The basis for VRAG
Recidivists Nonrecidivists Total
High Risk 114 94 208
Low Risk 77 333 410
Total 191 427 618
These results indicate that among those patients classified as 
“high risk”, there was a recidivism rate of 55% (114/208), while 
the recidivism rate for those classified as “low risk” was 19% 
(77/410). The former result is very troubling. It indicates that the 
instrument was only slightly better than chance at predicting future 
dangerousness. Furthermore, if the resulting 94 false positives were 
placed in civil commitment, 15% of the total population would be 
unfairly committed. And since VRAG did not detect 40% of the total 
of recidivists (77/191), it failed to protect society by releasing a large 
number of future recidivists. These troubling results are reflected 
in the sensitivity and specificity of the instrument. Based only on 
this initial sample, VRAG has a very modest sensitivity as a predictor 
of violence (TP/(TP + FN) = 114/(114+77) = 0.6). Its specificity is 
acceptable (TN/(TN + FP) = 333/(333+ 94) = 0.78).
During the last three decades, VRAG and many other actuarial 
instruments have been used in many different populations with 
varying results. A complete discussion of the technical details 
regarding the statistical methods used to assess the predictive 
validity of VRAG and other instruments falls beyond the scope of this 
essay62. The following paragraphs can only offer a faint flavor of a 
highly technical discussion. Many defenders of actuarial instruments 
measure predictive accuracy using an index of sensitivity and 
specificity across score thresholds known as “area under the curve” 
(AUC). AUC values lie between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating perfect 
discriminatory ability and 0.5 indicating discriminatory ability 
no better than chance. In most studies, AUC values for actuarial 
instruments fall between 0.5 and 163, with the most popular of them 
62  For a detailed technical discussion of the assessment of predictive validity, see HAMILTON 
(2015, pp. 23-35).
63  RETTENBERGER et al., 2010.
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falling between 0.7 and 0.7564. What this means is that actuarial 
instruments have been able to classify violent and sexual recidivists 
at higher levels of risk than nonrecidivists about 70 to 75% of the 
time. Defenders of actuarial methods argue that these results 
represent moderate or large size effects. In statistics, an effect size is 
a measure of the strength of a phenomenon, such as the correlation 
between two variables. However, there is no consensus within the 
statistics community about the exact relationship between effect 
sizes and AUC values, and the former is often used inconsistently65. 
This lack of consensus within the statistics community weakens the 
claims of the defenders of actuarial methods.
It must be kept in mind that AUC is only an index of discrimination 
at the group level. It does not signify the probability that a particular 
individual was correctly classified: a high AUC value does not 
mean that a person classified as high risk will most likely become 
a recidivist. Furthermore, an actuarial instrument can have a high 
AUC even if the instrument is not well calibrated, that is, even if 
the percentage of predicted outcomes is significantly different than 
the proportion of actual outcomes66. Another way to put it is that 
AUC measures are not affected by the actual base rates of offending. 
Thus an instrument can have a high AUC and at the same time it can 
offer predictions that differ widely from the true rates of recidivism. 
Defenders of actuarial methods argue that the use of AUC values 
solves the low base rate problem discussed in previous paragraphs, 
but it is more adequate to say that it simply ignores the problem67, 
with dire consequences: “Even with relatively high AUC values (e.g., 
0.8), predictions of the occurrence of low base rate events (e.g., 10% 
base rate or lower) will almost always result in a very large number 
of false positives”68.
Many meta-analyses of these instruments have confirmed that they 
lead to an unacceptable number of false positives69. One of those 
studies, which offered a systematic review and meta-analysis of 251 
64  Singh et al, 2011. AUC for VRAG’s initial sample was 0.72. This is not very impressive if we 
consider that a good AUC for a medical diagnosis test is normally above 0.8.
65 KellEY & PREACHER, 2012.
66  HAMILTON, 2015.
67 AMENTA et al., 2003.
68 ROSENFELD et al., 2011, p. 41.
69 SINGH et al., 2011.
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validation studies of nine popular actuarial instruments —including 
VRAG, SORAG, Static 99, and PCL-R— offered the following results: 
Only 41% of people classified as moderate or high risk by violence 
risk assessment tools violently reoffended, 23% of people classified 
as moderate or high risk by sexual risk assessment tools sexually 
reoffended, and 52% of people classified as moderate or high risk 
by generic risk assessment tools went on to commit unspecified 
offenses70. On a brighter note, the instruments were able to identify 
low risk individuals with high levels of accuracy. The authors 
concluded: “One implication of these findings is that, even after 30 
years of development, the view that violence, sexual, or criminal 
risk can be predicted in most cases is not evidence based. (…) [R]isk 
assessment tools in their current form can only be used to roughly 
classify individuals at the group level, and not to safely determine 
criminal prognosis in an individual case”71.
4. UNFORESEEN CONSEQUENCES OF ACTUARIAL 
METHODS
A very sensitive statistical instrument is optimal when one prefers 
to obtain a much larger number of false positives than of false 
negatives, i.e., when one prefers that the number of undetected 
recidivist inmates be minimized, while paying the price of keeping 
many future nonrecidivists in prison. In contrast, a very specific 
instrument is optimal when one prefers to obtain a much larger 
number of false negatives than of false positives, i.e., when one 
prefers to reduce the number of imprisoned future nonrecidivists 
while taking the risk of releasing many future recidivists. The decision 
to adopt a very sensitive or a very specific instrument, or to adjust its 
parameters to make it more sensitive or specific, should be guided 
by a previous theoretical analysis regarding the price that we, as a 
society, are willing to pay in terms of civil liberties to guarantee our 
safety. It should also be informed by a theory of fair punishment. 
Unfortunately, the rush to adopt actuarial method has been guided 
by neither. As Harcourt points out:
70  FAZEL et al., 2012.
71  FAZEL et al., 2012, p. 5.
THE PREDICTION OF FUTURE BEHAVIOR: THE EMPTY PROMISES OF 
EXPERT CLINICAL AND ACTUARIAL TESTIMONY91
TE
O
RI
A 
JU
RÍ
DI
CA
 C
O
N
TE
M
PO
RÂ
N
EA
1:
1-
1,
 ja
ne
iro
-ju
nh
o 
20
16
 ©
 2
01
6 
PP
G
D/
U
FR
J, 
p.
 7
4-
10
0
[T]he proliferation of actuarial methods has begun to bias our concep-
tion of just punishment. (…) [T]hese actuarial instruments represent 
nothing more than fortuitous advances in technical knowledge from 
disciplines, such as sociology and psychology, that have no normative 
stake in the criminal law. These technological advances are, in effect, 
exogenous shocks to our legal systems, and this raises very troubling 
questions about what theory of just punishment we would indepen-
dently embrace and how it is, exactly, that we have allowed technical 
knowledge, somewhat arbitrarily, to dictate the path of justice72.
A related point has to do with the cutoff points in the instrument’s 
scoring system. Why is 7 instead of 8 the cutoff point for “high risk” 
in VRAG? Neither clinicians nor statistician have a commonly agreed 
definition of “high risk.” In the case of VRAG, the cutoff point was 
chosen because it offered, in the authors’ opinion, the best trade-
off between sensitivity and specificity. But that trade-off was judged 
under the assumption that false positives and false negatives have 
“an equivalent cost”73. However, there is a long tradition in law that 
regards a false positive as much more costlier than a false negative. 
This tradition is captured by Blackstone’s ratio (“the law holds it better 
that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent party suffer”) 
and by the idea that justice must err on the side of innocence. Laudan 
has argued that “a standard of proof is best conceived as a mechanism 
for distributing errors. That, in turn, suggests that if we could figure 
out the relative cost to society of false convictions and false acquittals, 
we might be able to use the ratio of these costs as a mechanism for 
determining the height of the SoP”74. Given the consequences to the 
prisoner of being classified as high risk using an actuarial instrument, 
the cut-off point can also be regarded as a sort of standard of proof, 
and its determination must also be based on our societal conception 
of the cost of a false positive and a false negative.
Another related consequence of classifying individuals as high- 
or low-risk is that the cutoff point might distort the standard of 
proof used in trial. If the standard of proof is preponderance of the 
72  HARCOURT, 2007, p. 3.
73  HARRIS et al., 1993, p. 329. In more recent times, Harris and Rice have added that “it can be 
reasonable for public policy to operate on the basis that a miss (e.g., failing to detain a violent 
recidivist beforehand) is twice as costly as a false alarm (e.g., detaining a violent offender who 
would not commit yet another violent offense)” (2013, p. 106).
74  LAUDAN, 2006, p. 68.
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evidence, being classified as “high risk” will tilt the scales against 
the defendant, while under a standard of clear and convincing 
evidence, being classified as “low risk” will tilt them in favor of the 
defendant. Furthermore, there is a risk that actuarial instruments 
will usurp the factfinder’s role. In a criminal trial, it is the judge’s role 
to make judgments on the question of reliability and truthfulness 
of an actuarial instrument. In Allen’s words, “there is no such thing 
as ‘naked statistical evidence.’ All evidence presented at trial will be 
tested by the factfinder’s epistemology”75. The problem is that most 
factfinders do not have the required knowledge to undertake an 
epistemological analysis of actuarial instruments. To do so, they must 
understand the underlying statistical techniques, which are far from 
intuitive. In addition, in most cases there will be no more available 
evidence upon which to base a decision, other than additional clinical 
or actuarial expert testimony, and a factfinder might be tempted 
to simply rely on the score provided by the instrument, resulting 
in what Roberts and Zuckerman call “trial by scientific expert”76. 
Even when there is ancillary evidence, the use of actuarial evidence 
can generate an anchoring effect. An anchoring bias occurs when a 
person places too heavy a weight on a single piece of information. 
It is a cognitive heuristic that helps decisionmakers face complex 
judgments, but it is also liable to generate errors. If decisionmakers 
anchor their decisions on actuarial tools, the potential for error is 
thereby increased.
A further problem with the classificatory standards of actuarial 
tools is that some of them will classify an individual as “high risk” 
while others will classify the same individual as “low risk”77. The 
future of an individual therefore depends on the choice of actuarial 
instrument! The lack of convergence on the same cutoff point is 
further evidence of their inability to adequately track the rate of 
recidivism. Furthermore, it is not clear either why falling into the 
“high risk” category automatically corresponds to a decision of 
continued imprisonment. Why is a specific probability of recidivism 
associated with that decision? And how is that probability connected 
to the duration of a prolonged sentence?
75  ALLEN, 1991, p. 1098.
76  ROBERTS and ZUCKERMAN, 2010, p. 489.
77  BARBAREE et al., 2006.
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Additionally, actuarial instruments have not been designed to help 
us understand “low risk” individuals. “Low risk” individuals are just 
those people who happen not to be “high risk”. The instruments 
provide no information regarding the factors that diminish their 
propensity towards violent or sexual recidivism, and are therefore 
useless in helping policymakers evaluate how effective rehabilitation 
and socialization programs really are78. From a pragmatic point of 
view it is understandable that the instruments focus on factors that 
serve as predictors for recidivism, but decisions are being made 
about low risk individuals despite the fact that these instruments 
offer no information about them.
Finally, it seems epistemically unacceptable to use actuarial 
instruments developed in North America in other continents with 
very different populations. Some studies suggest that the results 
vary according to population. For example, VRAG works better in the 
UK and Canada than in the United States79. There is also evidence 
that the predictive validity of VRAG is gender dependent: it works 
better with male inmates80. Currently there are no actuarial risk 
assessment instruments designed specifically for use with female 
inmates. If the use of actuarial instruments cannot be avoided, 
they should at least be tailored to take into account the specific 
socioeconomic and clinical circumstances of female delinquents81.
5. CONCLUSIONS
There are several lessons that can be learned from this dire 
landscape. To avoid the violation of due process generated by the use 
of clinical or actuarial predictions in judicial proceedings, one option 
is to convert Daubert into a constitutional principle, as suggested by 
Beecher-Monas82. The Daubert standard is only required in federal 
courts in the United States; its adoption at the state level, and in any 
kind of judicial proceeding, would go a long ways towards cutting the 
78  HAMILTON, 2014.
79  YANG et al., 2010.
80  HASTINGS et al., 2012.
81  Interestingly, clinicians are also far worse at predicting future violent offenses committed 
by females. According to one study, their accuracy did not differ from chance. Apparently, their 
inaccuracy appeared to be a function of their underestimation of the base rate of violence 
among mentally disordered women (Lidz et al., 1993).
82  BEECHER-MONAS, 2007.
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ground from under that particular type of expert testimony. There 
is a risk, however, that courts will be willing to lower the Daubert 
standard for evidence that originates in the social sciences. In fact, 
this has already happened. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in 
Nenno v. State (1998) stated that “[w]hen addressing fields of study 
aside from the hard sciences, such as the social sciences or fields 
that are based primarily upon experience and training as opposed to 
the scientific method, [the law’s] requirement of reliability applies 
but with less rigor than to the hard sciences”83.
Perhaps the main response offered by defenders of actuarial methods 
when confronted with arguments such as the ones presented in this 
paper is that there is nothing better in the offing: “Demonstrably 
less accurate methods of risk appraisal are widely used instead […] 
The only ethical course of action is to use the most accurate system 
available, even if it is imperfect84. But there is a more ethical course of 
action, and it is to stop using these methods tout court. One cannot 
but agree with Beecher-Monas when she says that the current 
state of affairs undermines the rule of law: “Admitting scientifically 
baseless expert testimony on future dangerousness into evidence is 
not only cynical, it also undermines law´s moral authority. The very 
least we can do in system that aspires to do justice is to be sure 
that the scientific testimony admitted in our courts has been tested, 
scrutinized, and properly limited”85.
Eliminating the prediction of future dangerousness as a factor 
in sentencing and establishing instead the use of metrics based 
on the harm caused, the degree of responsibility of the accused, 
and previous convictions will be a more just course of action than 
using demonstrably flawed decision methods. The prediction of 
future dangerousness can also be eliminated as a factor in deciding 
parole. The only criteria available for parole decisions ought to be 
statistically solid factors such as an advanced age. The recidivism 
rate of rapists steadily decreases with age, and prisoners over 60 
are very unlikely to commit violent or sexual crimes if released86. 
The risk of error in releasing such prisoners is so low that it is worth 
83  Nenno v. State, p. 561 quoted by MONAHAN, 2000, p. 912.
84  QUINSEY et al., 1998, p. 176.
85  BEECHER-MONAS, 2007, p. 167.
86  HANSON, 2002.
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taking, especially in light of the obvious benefit or resocializing 
an individual and freeing up sorely needed space to detain truly 
dangerous individuals. Furthermore, if rehabilitation programs that 
establish equivalences between work/study and sentence reduction 
are to have a real impact, their results must be a starting point in all 
bail decisions.
I would like to end by clarifying that none of the objections to actuarial 
methods presented in this paper appeal to what is often called the 
“G2i” problem: the intrinsic difficulties involved in the application 
of tools designed at the group level to individual cases87. I have no 
concerns regarding many of the applications in the individual case of 
conclusions derived from the general case when the price to be paid 
in terms of errors is socially or scientifically acceptable.88 But actuarial 
instruments, as we have seen in this paper, demand an extremely 
high price in terms of false positives, and that by itself is sufficient 
reason to reject their use in the individual case, independently of 
whether, in general, statistical generalizations devoid of any causal 
support can be the basis for individualized legal decisions.
87  FAIGMAN et al., 2014.
88  See SCHAUER, 2003, for a general defense of the use of generalizations in legal decision-
making. Schauer is careful to acknowledge that error rates that are scientifically acceptable 
need not be legally acceptable: “Science can tell us that a certain scientific process has, say, a 
12 percent error rate (or specific rates of Type I and Type II errors or false positives and false 
negatives). And scientists must decide for their own scientific purposes whether such rates are 
sufficient, for example, to assert that something is the case, conclude that a finding is adequate 
for publication, or find a research program promising enough to renew a research grant. But 
whether such an error rate is sufficient for a trier of fact to hear it, put someone in jail, keep 
someone out of jail, justify an injunction, or award damages is not itself a scientific question” 
(2010, p. 1214).
(...) none of 
the objections 
to actuarial 
methods 
presented in this 
paper appeal 
to what is 
often called the 
“G2i” problem: 
the intrinsic 
difficulties 
involved in the 
application of 
tools designed at 
the group level 
to individual 
cases. 
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